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By DAVID  BACKUS AND JOHN DRIFFILL* 
Economists  have  speculated  for  years 
about the source of the apparent inflationary 
bias  of  market economies. In the 1960's the 
Phillips  curve  supplied part of  an  explana- 
tion: with a stable tradeoff between inflation 
and  output,  governments  might  reasonably 
choose  a  positive  rate of  inflation,  even  if 
they  find  inflation  distasteful,  in  order  to 
raise output. 
Natural  rate theories changed all that. If 
the  government  can  only  raise output  with 
surprise inflation, then systematic expansion- 
ary policy  will generate inflation but fail to 
raise output.  If  a stable price level is desir- 
able,  the  only  sensible policy  is  zero infla- 
tion.  The  question  then is why government 
policy  has  tolerated persistent high rates of 
inflation over the past decade or so. 
One answer is that zero inflation is not a 
credible policy if the government is known to 
care  about  output.  This has arisen as  "dy- 
namic  inconsistency"  in  Finn  Kydland  and 
Edward Prescott (1977) and as inferiority of 
Nash  solutions  in  Robert Barro and David 
Gordon  (1983a,b),  but generally reflects the 
fact that noncooperative equilibria need not 
be Pareto optimal. 
Another  line  of  argument runs that gov- 
ernments,  exploiting  the short memories of 
voters,  overheat  the economy prior to  elec- 
tions.  (William  Nordhaus,  1975,  provides 
such  a  model  of  "political  business cycles" 
and  Gerald  Kramer, 1971,  and  Ray  Fair, 
1978, report evidence that voters seem to be 
shortsighted;  Henry Chappell, 1983, gives a 
conflicting  view.) This mechanism, however, 
only leads to an inflationary bias if the Phil- 
lips  curve is  nonlinear, so  that high output 
raises  inflation  by  more  than  low  output 
reduces it. 
In  the  following  sections  we  extend  the 
work of  Barro and Gordon to a situation in 
which the public is uncertain about the pref- 
erences  of  the  government:  in  particular, 
whether  it  cares  about  unemployment  and 
output.  Thus,  when  the  government  an- 
nounces  its  intention  to  fight  inflation  re- 
gardless  of  the  output  cost,  the  public  is 
uncertain whether this is in fact the case, or 
whether it is  simply an attempt to manipu- 
late their expectations. This analysis of repu- 
tation,  based  on  David  Kreps  and  Robert 
Wilson (1982b), provides a useful formaliza- 
tion of the credibility problem faced by mac- 
roeconomic  policymakers,  and  stressed  re- 
peatedly by William Fellner (1982). 
One  feature  of  the  model  is  that  tight 
macroeconomic  policy  aimed at eliminating 
inflation  will reduce output below the natu- 
ral rate if  the public thinks the government 
may  inflate.  Peter  Howitt  (1982)  makes  a 
similar  point  without  elaborating  on  the 
source of the public's skepticism. The critical 
element in our model is the public's lack of 
information  about  the government: even  if 
the  government  is  serious about  combating 
inflation,  the  public  cannot know  this with 
certainty.  Completely  credible noninflation- 
ary policy is generally not possible. 
A  second  feature  of  the  analysis  is  that 
government policy is dynamically consistent: 
in equilibrium the government always finds it 
optimal to stick to its initial plan. By treating 
policy as a dynamic game and applying Kreps 
and  Wilson's  (1982a)  notion  of  sequential 
equilibrium, we  avoid the "inconsistency  of 
optimal plans" that has plagued studies that 
view policy as an optimization problem. 
At  the same  time we explain the political 
business  cycle  without  recourse  to  voter 
naivete.  Even  governments that  care about 
employment  will  tend,  at  the  start of  their 
terms  of  office,  to  act as if  they do  not  in 
order to keep alive in the mind of the public 
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the possibility  that they will fight inflation at 
all  costs.  Of  course,  such governments will 
always inflate near the end of their terms in 
an attempt to raise output. What is more, it 
will  work: output  rises (probabilistically) as 
long as the government still has a reputation 
for  toughness.  The  public  acts  rationally 
throughout:  it  simply  does  not  know  what 
the government plans to do. 
These  ideas  are developed  in  the rest of 
the  paper.  Section  I  reviews  the  Barro- 
Gordon  model.  The  analysis of  Kreps and 
Wilson is applied to this model in Section II. 
A  numerical example and discussion follow. 
The  final  section  contains  general remarks 
about  the  strengths  and  limitations  of  the 
analysis. 
I. The Barro-Gordon  Analysis 
Barro  and  Gordon  (1983b)  characterize 
macroeconomic  policy as a game. Output is 
determined by a Phillips curve with the natu- 
ral rate property: 
Y  Yn +  (x 
_ 
Xe) 
where y is output,  yn is the natural rate, and 
x  and  xe  are actual and expected inflation. 
The  government  likes  output  and  dislikes 
inflation,  which  we  may formalize with  the 
one-period payoff function 
(1)  Ug(X,  Xe)  =-4ax2  + b(y  -  yn) 
=-  aX2  ?  b(x-xe). 
The public,  on  the other hand, resists being 
fooled;  that is, they maximize 
(2)  up(x,  Xe)  =  -  (x  -  xe)2 
As  Barro and  Gordon  (1983a)  argue, these 
payoffs  are consistent  with  the  government 
and  the public  having identical preferences. 
If  the  natural rate of  unemployment is  too 
high, perhaps because of  taxes or externali- 
ties, then everyone might agree that maximiz- 
ing (1) is desirable. But for individual agents, 
aggregate  inflation  and  output  are  givens; 
the  best  they  can  do  is  forecast  inflation 
accurately.  The  game  consists  then  of  the 
government  choosing  x  and  the  public 
choosing  xe,  with payoffs given by equations 
(1) and (2). 
Now  consider,  as do  Barro and Gordon, 
the Nash  solution to the game in which both 
players  move  simultaneously.  With  both 
government and public maximizing given the 
other's decision,  the solution is 
x=b/a  and  xe=  b/a. 
The  model  explains  inflation  as  the  Nash 
equilibrium  to  a  policy  game.  The  payoffs 
are  ug=  -(1/2)b2/a  and  up =0,  which  is 
Pareto inferior to the zero-inflation solution 
(x  =xe=0)  in which ug =up =0. 
Barro and Gordon argue persuasively that 
the inefficiency stems from the government's 
inability to commit itself to a noninflationary 
policy.  Suppose,  for example, that the gov- 
ernment were able to move first, committing 
itself  to  a particular rate of  inflation. Then 
an  intelligent  government  would  choose  x 
taking  into  account  the  public's  response 
(namely,  x e =  x)  and pick zero inflation. 
But  when  the  government  cannot  make 
prior  commitments,  it  faces  a  problem  in 
convincing  the  public  that  it  will,  in  fact, 
choose  zero  inflation.  For if  the public  be- 
lieves  this, the government has an incentive 
to  inflate  at  rate  x =  b/a,  thereby  raising 
output  and  the  government's payoff.  Using 
the  normalization  a = b = 2,  we  can  repre- 
sent  policy  as  a  matrix  game  with  two 
strategies (x,  xe  = 0 or 1), and payoffs 
public 
xe  =  0  xe  =  1 
government x =  0  0,0  -2,  -1 
x=1  1,-I  -1,0. 
(In  each  ordered  pair  the  government's 
payoffs  are  listed  first.) The  problem  from 
this point of view is that x = 1 is a dominant 
strategy for the government: the payoffs are 
larger  regardless  of  what  the  public  does. 
The  public,  therefore,  sensibly  expects  the 
government  to  inflate.  The  result  is  the 
Pareto-inferior solution x  =  xe  =1. 532  THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW  JUNE  1985 
Barro and Gordon then consider the possi- 
bility  that  the  government can  establish  a 
reputation for avoiding inflation if the game 
is  repeated  infinitely  many  times.  Let  the 
government's  payoff  for  the repeated game 
be 
00 
Jg  =Ec  ug(Xt,  Xe )  0  <  c < 1, 
t =  0 
with  c  a  discount  factor. Then  Barro and 
Gordon  (1983b),  applying results similar to 
James  Friedman  (1971;  1977,  ch.  8),  show 
that the strategies 
e  {  xX  if  xt 1  = x* 
xt  - 
1  otherwise 
Xt =x* 
do  not  constitute  a Nash  equilibrium when 
x* = 0. The problem is that the government's 
benefit  from  cheating  (the  extra  payoff  of 
+1  when  x=1  and  xe=0)  is  equal  to  its 
cost  (the  loss  of  1  when  Xe  = 1  and  the 
government  returns  to  zero  inflation).  But 
since  the  latter  comes  later,  the  discount 
factor  ensures  that  cheating  is  a  superior 
strategy and  x* = 0 is therefore not a Nash 
equilibrium  with  the  given  "punishment" 
strategy.  They  go  on  to  argue  that  some 
positive  rates  of  inflation  x*  can  be  sus- 
tained as Nash  equilibria, and it seems clear 
that  even  zero  could  be  sustained  with  a 
longer  punishment  interval if  c  is  not  too 
small. 
A  weakness  of  this  analysis  is  that  the 
punishment  strategy played  by  the  private 
sector (punish the government by playing xt 
equal  to  l  if  xt1,  is not zero) is essentially 
arbitrary. Further, the equilibrium which is 
sustained depends critically on the form this 
punishment strategy takes. The infinite hori- 
zon game has multiple Nash equilibria, with 
no  mechanism  for  choosing  among  them. 
The  Kreps-Wilson (1982b) analysis of repu- 
tation,  to  which  we  now  turn, avoids  these 
problems and illuminates a number of other 
issues as well. 
I1. Reputational  Equilibrium 
Consider  now  the  possibility  that  the 
government may behave in one of two ways: 
it  may behave  as if it is rationally attempt- 
ing  to  maximize  the  utility  function  (1)  (a 
"4wet"  government); or it may behave as if it 
is committed  irrevocably to pursuing a zero- 
inflation  policy  (a  "  hard-nosed"  (H-N) 
government).  Wet  governments  therefore 
have payoffs 
public 
xe  =  O  xe  =  1 
wet  government  x  =  0  0  -  2 
x=1  1  -1, 
as  in  the  previous  section.  Hard-nosed 
governments,  however,  behave  as  if  their 
payoffs are 
public 
x  =0  xe=1 
H-N government x =0  0  0 
x =1  -1  -1, 
which we might derive by setting b =0  in the 
government payoff function (1). They there- 
fore  have no  incentive  to inflate, regardless 
of  expectations.  The  public's  payoffs  are 
given by equation (2): 
public 
xe  =0  xe  =1 
government x  0  0  -1 
x-l  -1  0. 
The crux of  the analysis is that the public 
does  not  know  which  type  of  government 
behavior  it  faces.  As  a  result,  even  a  wet 
government  may  choose  not  to  inflate.  By 
resisting inflation it develops a reputation for 
being hard nosed which it hopes will discour- 
age expectations of inflation in the future. In 
this section  we  examine such a reputational 
equilibrium in  a finitely repeated version of 
the  Barro-Gordon  policy  game  when  the 
public  is  uncertain  about  the government's 
behavior. The  analysis is identical to Kreps 
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tial  respects. The  solution  concept is  Kreps 
and Wilson's (1982a) sequential equilibrium, 
which  enables us to find the solution recur- 
sively, starting with the final period. 
The  central  feature of  the  model  is  the 
government's ability to manipulate its repu- 
tation. The government enters period t, say, 
with  a  reputation  Pt  equal  to  the  public's 
probability  that  the  government  is  hard 
nosed.  By assumption both  the government 
and  the  public  know Pt. Both players then 
choose  their best strategies, given the other's 
strategy and  the impact of current behavior 
on  the  next  period's reputation. The  prob- 
ability pt  is then revised in light of observed 
behavior according to Bayes' rule. 
Each  player's  strategy  is  usefully  char- 
acterized as a probability of playing zero in a 
mixed  strategy:  denoted  zt  for  the  public 
and  yt for the government. Then the govern- 
ment's reputation next period, Pt+ 1, is zero if 
it inflates this period (or has ever inflated in 
the  past)  since  H-N  governments never in- 
flate. Given no inflation, Bayes' rule gives the 
probability as 
pt+1 = prob(H-Nlxt  = 0), 
= prob( H-N and x, = O)/prob(x,  = 0), 
=  prob(x  =  OIH-N)prob(H-N) 
/[prob(xt  =  OIH-N)prob(H-N) 
+ prob(xt  =  Olwet)prob(wet)I, 
or 
(3)  Pt  + i = Pt/  Pt + (1-  Pt) Yt] 
In this game, as in the version of  the chain 
store paradox analyzed by Kreps and Wilson 
(1982b,  Sec. 2), the probability pt  is a suffi- 
cient  statistic  for past play and contains all 
the  relevant  information  needed  by  the 
players to make optimal decisions. 
Consider now the solution of the game. In 
the  final period,  T, a  H-N  government will 
always play  XT=  0.  The expected return for 
a wet government is 
(4)  Jg(T,  PT)  =  ZT[YT(O)+  (1  YT)(1)I 
+(1-ZT)[YT(-2)+(1  YT)(  1)I 
=  (2ZT-1)-  YT 
Since  this is  declining in  YT,  a wet govern- 
ment  will  always  inflate in  the last  period: 
YT  =  0.  Similarly,  the  public's  expected 
payoff is 
JP  (  T, PT)  =  ZT [  PT(O) + (1  PT)(  1)] 
+ (  -ZT)  [ PT(  1) + (1 -PT)(0)] 
=  ZT(2PT  1)  PT- 
Thus  if  PT  > 1/2  the public plays  ZT  =  1(XT 
= 0),  if  PT  < 1/2  it  plays  ZT =O,  and  if 
PT  =  1/2  the public is completely indifferent 
about  ZT. The  equilibrium strategy in  this 
case  (zT=1/2  when  PT=1/2)  will  be  de- 
rived below  from the equilibrium conditions 
for  the  preceding  period. The  value  to  the 
government  to  playing the game in  the last 
period is therefore 
{  1  if PT> 1/2, 
Vg(T, PT)  0  if PT  =1/2, 
-1  if pT<  1/2. 
The value to the public is 
vp(T,  PT)  =  max(-  PT,  PT  1). 
In period T -1,  the government must con- 
sider the impact of its behavior on its reputa- 
tion  in  the  final period. The expected  two- 
period payoff is 
Jg(T-  1, PT-1) 
=  ZT-1  [YT-1(0)+  (1  YT-1)(1)] 
+  (1-Z  YT  -1Y(TPT  2)+  (1  YT-1)(  1)] 
+  YT _ lVg(  T PT) + (1 -YT-1  )(-  1). 534  THE A MERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW  JUNE  1985 
The  last  term  reflects  the  fact  that  if  the 
government inflates in period T -1,  which it 
does  with  probability  (1-  YT- 1)  then  its 
reputation  is  blown;  the public  will  expect 
inflation in  the final period and the govern- 
ment's  payoff  in  that  period  is  -1.  The 
penultimate  term is the probability of play- 
ing  zero  actual inflation in  T-  1, and then 
collecting  the payoff in  T associated with a 
reputation  PT,  where PT  is given by  equa- 
tion (3). The expression reduces to 
(5)  Jg(T-1,  PT-1)=  2ZT-1-2 
+  YT- 1vg(T,  PT). 
The public's two-period payoff is 
Jp(T-  1, PT-1)  =  ZT-1(2qT-1  -1)  qT-1 
+  qt-1'  vp(T, PT), 
where qt-1 = PT-1  +(1  -  PT-1)YT-1- 
The  government  now  chooses  YT-1  to 
maximize (5) subject to (3). For PT-  1 > 1/2, 
this  implies  YT-1=1,  hence  PT=PT-l> 
1/2,  Vg(T,PT)=l,  and ZT=1.  That is, the 
government  plays  xT1  =  0  with  certainty; 
its  reputation  does  not change, but it is al- 
ready  sufficient  to  ensure  that  the  public 
does  not  expect  inflation in the last period. 
For  0 <  PT-1  <1/2,  the  government  plays 
zero inflation with probability 
YT-1  =  PT_  1/[1  PT-1]- 
If by chance  it fails to inflate, its reputa- 
tion  for being  hard nosed  rises in  the next 
period  to  1/2.  Since  PT-1  <1/2  it is  clear 
that  YT-1  is strictly less than one. But since 
YT-  1 maximizes (5), this can only be true if 
Vg(T, PT)  =  0.  From (4) we see then that  ZT 
must be 1/2,  as we claimed earlier. 
If  PT-1  is  exactly  1/2  then  YT-1  is  one 
and it appears that any value of  ZT between 
one-half  and  one  is  consistent  with  equi- 
librium.  We  assume in  this case  that  ZT  = 
1/2.  This  assumption  is  analogous  to  one 
made  by  Kreps  and  Wilson  and  has  no 
material effect on the results. 
The  solution  of  the  game  as  described 
has  the  property  that  both  (XT,  YT)  and 
(XT-1,  YT-19  XT,  YT)  are  Nash  equilibria. 
This  recursive  structure, which  Kreps  and 
Wilson  (1982a)  have  labeled  "sequential 
equilibrium,"  imposes  a  condition  on  the 
solution  analogous  to  the principle of  opti- 
mality.  In  period  T-1,  we  only  consider 
period  T  strategies  which  are  themselves 
Nash  equilibria. As a result, the equilibrium 
is dynamically consistent by construction. 
With similar reasoning the solution can be 
extended  to  earlier periods. Equilibrium be- 
havior  is  conveniently  summarized as  fol- 
lows. (i)  In period t, the private sector plays 
zero  expected  inflation  with  probability  zt 
given by 
I  if Pt>  (1/2) 
zt =  1/2  if pt=  (1/2)  T-t+1 
z  O  if Pt < (1/2) 
(ii)  A wet government plays actual inflation 
equal to zero with probability yt given by 
if p, >  (1/2)Tt 




it  I-1P(t/2) 
if O < p, < (1/2)  T 
O  if p,=O. 
(iii)  The probability of the government being 
hard  nosed  is  revised  in  accordance  with 
Bayes' rule: 
if xt=O, 
Pt + (I -  MtYt 
P  0+l=lo  if xt=I 
o rpt=O. 
(iv)  The  expected  payoff  to  a  wet  govern- 
ment  on  entering  stage  t  of  the game with 
reputation  pt is given by 
Jg(t, Pt)  = 2zt-(T-t  +?1) 
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where vg(t + 1, pt+ 1) is the value of the game 
next  period  conditional  on  not  inflating in 
period  t.  In  equilibrium the value function 
for a wet government is therefore 
t-T-l  if O<p,<  (1/2) 
t-T?T  if  -,(1/2) 
v,  Pt 
t  -  T  I  if  (1/2  )T-t  -  vg(t,p,)~~~~~  Pt  t-+  if1/2)T  ) 
t -  T + 2 + i  if (1/2) 
< pt S (1/2) 
for  i  =  ,  T  -  t  -i- 
for  i=O,l...T-t-1, 
and t=1,2,...,T-1. 
111. Reputation and Dynamically Consistent 
Policy: An Example 
To get an idea as to what kinds of behav- 
ior are implied by the theory, let us look at 
an  example.  Suppose  a  wet  government 
comes to power with a five-year term (T = 5, 
with no possibility  of reelection) and that at 
the beginning  of  its  term it is strongly sus- 
pected of being wet. To be specific, let us say 
that  it  is  believed  to  be  hard  nosed  with 
probability  lying  somewhere between  1/16 
and  1/32,  although none  of  the qualitative 
conclusions  depend on these values. 
The play  progresses as follows.  In period 
1,  the  public  chooses  xfe  = 0  with  certainty 
and  the  government  chooses  x1 =  O with 
probability l5pi/(l  -  Pi)  < 1. If xl = 0 is ac- 
tually  played,  the  game continues  with  the 
government's  reputation  enhanced  (P2  = 
1/24  =  1/16).  If the government inflates, its 
reputation  is  ruined, and the equilibrium is 
x  =  xe  =  1 for the rest of the game. 
In later periods, if the government has not 
yet  inflated, its  reputation rises just  enough 
to induce the public to choose zero expected 
inflation with probability 1/2.  Three points 
are noteworthy.  (i)  Reputation  is  only  en- 
hanced (pt > pt- 1 given that x, -1 = 0) if the 
government  plays  x-1  =  0 with probability 
less  than  one.  Acquiring a  reputation thus 
involves  taking  a  risk. (ii)  In  each  period 
after the first, given that actual inflation was 
zero  in  the  preceding  period,  the  public 
randomizes  with  a  constant  probability  of 
1/2.  Thus  there is  a positive probability of 
getting  xe  =l,  x =  0  and therefore a reces- 
sion.  The revised estimates that the govern- 
ment  is  hard nosed  are not  enough  to  dis- 
courage  the public  completely from playing 
Xe  =  1.  (iii)  The  probability  that  a  wet 
government  survives  until  the  last  period 
without ruining its reputation is just equal to 
pll(l  -p),  so it pays to have a good repu- 
tation. 
Let  us  consider  now  the problem of  dy- 
namic  inconsistency  and  the  definition  of 
optimal  policy.  As  Kydland  and  Prescott 
showed,  the  ex  ante  optimal policy  is  typi- 
cally dynamically inconsistent, and therefore 
not  credible.  But  the  outcome  of  the  best 
consistent policy is frequently worse than the 
ex  ante  optimal  policy if  the latter is credi- 
ble. 
Our own  solution is, by construction, dy- 
namically  consistent  and  credibility is  con- 
veniently  summarized by  the reputation,  p. 
It  is  easy  to  see  that  the  sequential  equi- 
librium  is  the  best  credible policy.  In  our 
example,  the  payoff  to  the  government  of 
following  the  consistent  sequential  equi- 
librium  policy  is  vg(l, Pl) = -3.  Alterna- 
tively, suppose  the government played  x = 1 
in every period. The public, given 1/16  < P 
< 1/32,  would  play  xl  =0  and  X<=1  (t= 
2,...,5),  giving  the government a payoff of 
-4.  The outcome involves actual inflation in 
every  period,  which  is  a  surprise only  in 
period  1.  (If  the  private sector  anticipated 
x1 = 1, the government payoff would be  -  5.) 
Finally, if the government announced that it 
would never inflate, the outcome depends on 
whether  it  is  believed  or  not.  If  p 1  truly 
captures  the  public's  beliefs,  then  the  out- 
come  is zero actual inflation in each period, 
but zero expected inflation with certainty in 
period 1 and with probability 1/2  thereafter, 
giving the government an expected payoff of 
-4.  If  the  announced  zero-inflation policy 
were believed (because of an associated con- 
stitutional  amendment,  for  example),  then 
the government's payoff would be zero. 
It is  clear, then, that the sequential equi- 
librium  is  dominated  only  by  the  fully  be- 
lieved  zero-inflation  commitment, given  the 
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the government. It is always at least as good 
as  pursuing  a  zero-inflation  policy  "come 
what may," in the face of a poor reputation. 
Thus,  in  the  presence  of  public  skepticism 
(p1 <1),  and  in  the  absence of  irrevocable 
commitments,  the  sequential equilibrium is 
at least as good  as (and usually better than) 
the time-inconsistent  ex ante optimal policy 
of  setting  xt=  0 in all periods. The concept 
of  sequential  equilibrium removes  the  am- 
biguity from the definition of optimal policy. 
The analysis also sheds light on the results 
of  Barro and  Gordon.  If  a  government is 
optimizing over a long time horizon (T),  and 
its  initial  reputation is  "good" in  the sense 
that p1 is much larger than (1/2)T,  then the 
solution  will  have  the  following  property. 
There will be an initial period in which zero 
inflation  is  expected,  and zero actual infla- 
tion occurs. The first period in which there is 
a  departure  from  this pattern is  period  n, 
where  n  is  the  smallest  integer  for  which 
(1/2)T-n  >  p  >  (1/2)T-nll.  In this period 
the government will begin to create inflation 
with  some  nonzero  probability.  In  subse- 
quent  periods,  conditional  on  having  ob- 
served zero inflation, the private sector will 
expect zero inflation with probability 1/2. 
As  T  increases for given  Pl,  n  increases 
also.  In contrast to Barro and Gordon, in a 
game  with  a  sufficiently long  time  horizon 
this analysis leads to the conclusion that for 
any nonzero initial reputation (p1 > 0) there 
will  be  an  initial  period  (which  tends  to 
infinity  as  the  horizon  tends to  infinity) in 
which  zero inflation is  the equilibrium out- 
come. This is supported by the "punishment 
strategy" for the private sector which makes 
xe  = 1  for all  t >  s  if x5 = 1. This strategy is 
rational if the government's behavior is used 
to draw inferences about its preferences. By 
contrast, Barro and Gordon (1983b) assume 
that the public "punishes" a deviant govern- 
ment  for  one  period,  without  rationalizing 
this  assumption,  and  argue that zero infla- 
tion cannot be supported in an infinite-hori- 
zon  game except by the use of rules to lend 
credibility  to  policy  announcements.  Our 
analysis would change somewhat if we intro- 
duced  a  discount  factor.  As  in  Barro and 
Gordon,  a  small  discount  factor  makes  it 
harder to sustain low inflation. 
IV. Final  Remarks 
The  Kreps-Wilson  analysis  fits  many  of 
the  observed  features  of  macroeconomic 
policy  quite well. First, it is commonplace to 
hear  politicians  reassure us  that  they  are 
serious  about  beating inflation. These state- 
ments are correctly regarded with skepticism, 
since both  hard-nosed and wet governments 
have an incentive to establish reputations for 
being  tough-that  is,  raise  p.  Conversely, 
governments  frequently complain  that their 
actions  are thwarted by  the "mistaken" ex- 
pectations  of labor unions, big business, and 
the  gnomes  of  Zurich. Note,  for  example, 
that even a hard-nosed government will suffer 
persistent  output  losses half the time as the 
public  randomizes, if its initial reputation is 
bad (p  is small). Wet governments will also 
induce  recessions  until, by  chance, they re- 
veal themselves to be wet. From then on the 
inflationary equilibrium (x = xe = 1) results. 
Second, the model provides an account of 
the  political  business  cycle  without  relying 
on  voter  myopia.  At  the  same  time  it  ex- 
plains the inflationary bias of policy without 
recourse  to  nonlinearities  in  the  Phillips 
curve. In the Nordhaus model, governments 
deflate early in  their terms and inflate later 
since  voters  place  more  weight  on  events 
immediately preceding the next election. The 
strategy  successfully  raises  output  because 
the public is doubly myopic: they forget the 
low  output  early in  the term and  they  fail 
to  predict  the  inflation later. In  the Kreps- 
Wilson framework, inflation at the end of the 
term is the rational response of a government 
that  cares  about  employment. It  works, on 
average, because the public is uncertain about 
the  government's  true character. Voters are 
not myopic;  they simply do not have all the 
information. 
The  logic  is just  the opposite  of  conven- 
tional  theory of  the political business cycle. 
Instead  of  having  a  government  create  a 
pre-election  boom  in  order  to  increase  its 
chance of reelection, our analysis generates a 
pre-election  boom  as the solution to a game 
with a wet lame-duck government. In fact, if 
there were a chance of reelection, the incen- 
tive  to  preserve reputation may actually re- 
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Third,  the  analysis  suggests  that govern- 
ments  may  try  to  appoint  central bankers 
with reputations for fighting inflation, even if 
their own  preferences place positive  weight 
on  employment.  By doing so they minimize 
the  costs  associated  with uncertainty about 
policy  (vp is highest when p  is zero or one) 
and with the credibility problem wet govern- 
ments  have  with  noninflationary  policies. 
Autonomous  central  banks  thus  act  as  a 
precommitment  device  which  may  help  to 
make noninflationary policies more credible 
and less costly. 
Despite  these  apparent  strengths  of  the 
analysis,  a few caveats are in order. On the 
technical side, the assumptions that there are 
only  two choices  for inflation may be unde- 
sirably restrictive. The lack of  dynamics re- 
lating inflation and output to their past val- 
ues is also troublesome. The possibility of an 
intransigent public sector is discussed in our 
earlier paper (1984). 
We  also have some doubt that the model 
explains  why  we  have  had  relatively  high 
inflation  during  the  past  fifteen years, but 
not  before.  James Tobin,  for one,  disagrees 
that  inflation  was  a  policy  choice  derived 
from a desire to raise employment. 
Today  a widespread version of  recent 
history is that governments deliberately 
sought  higher inflation in order to re- 
duce  unemployment....As  an  explan- 
ation  of  recent inflation in the United 
States this account is enormously exag- 
gerated....  The  1966-69  ride  up  the 
Phillips  curve  was  not  a  conscious 
choice of novel macroeconomic strategy 
but a timeworn political decision about 
wartime finance. Against the advice of 
his Keynesian advisors, President John- 
son  chose  for  his  own  reasons  of 
domestic  and international politics not 
to  ask Congress for increased taxes to 
finance his ill-starred escalation of  the 
conflict in Indochina. 
[1981, pp. 21-22] 
But whatever the origin of  the inflation, we 
think the model  helps to explain why disin- 
flation  took  so long and was so painful. By 
the mid-1970's, the public was highly skepti- 
cal  of  each  new  attempt  to  fight inflation, 
since so many attempts had been abandoned 
in  the  past.  Presumably even tough-minded 
policymakers  faced  a doubtful public. As  a 
result,  governments  who  cared  about  em- 
ployment  were  often  forced  (probabilisti- 
cally)  to continue inflationary policies. Gov- 
ernments who  wished only  to stop inflation 
could  not  easily persuade the public of  this 
fact, and therefore induced severe protracted 
recessions when they tried. 
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